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WELCOME AND INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 
PROFESSOR GRIFFITH: Welcome.  Good evening.  My name is 
Sean Griffith.  I am the T.J. Maloney Chair and Professor of Law here at 
Fordham Law School.  And I am also Director of the Fordham 
Corporate Law Center. 
I am delighted to welcome you all to the 13th Annual A.A. 
Sommer, Jr. Lecture.  Our speaker tonight is Benjamin M. Lawsky, 
Superintendent of the New York State Department of Financial 
Services.  His topic tonight is “Regulating in an Evolving Financial 
Landscape.”  In a few minutes, Ben Indek, Partner at Morgan, Lewis & 
Bockius will introduce Superintendent Lawsky. 
But first I have the privilege of welcoming you and making a few 
introductory remarks, first about the Sommer Lecture itself.  The 
Sommer Lecture is co-sponsored by Morgan Lewis and the Corporate 
Law Center, and it honors the legacy of former SEC Commissioner and 
former securities law practitioner Al Sommer.  Mr. Sommer was a 
guiding light on the Commission, an outstanding lawyer, and a mentor 
to many scholars and practitioners of securities law.  The annual 
Sommer Lecture is the Corporate Law Center’s longest running tradition 
here at Fordham Law School.  And at the 2007 Sommer Lecture, our 
speaker, SEC Commissioner Paul Atkins, remarked that the Sommer 
Lecture has become a prominent feature in the ongoing dialogue among 
security regulators, practitioners, and the regulated community, and I 
know that the lecture will continue that tradition tonight. 
The Sommer Lecture is hosted by the Fordham Corporate Law 
Center, and I will just mention what we do at the Corporate Law 
Center—we serve as the Law School’s nexus for discourse on issues of 
business law and policy.  We like to call the Center the platform from 
which the Law School launches its graduates on a business law 
trajectory and from which it launches its faculty members on their 
scholarly endeavors.  The Center has three principle target audiences 
and three target interests.  First, public lectures like this one seek to 
bring headline speakers to the Law School to speak to a community of 
alumni, faculty, friends, and students.  Second, we focus on our 
academic events.  We bring scholars from around the country and 
around the world to the Law School.  Thirdly, we bring friends and 
alumni back for our students, to provide them with networking 
opportunities and opportunities to learn how to get there from here. 
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The Corporate Law Center is especially excited about its new 
initiative in the area of Corporate Compliance.  This summer, the 
Corporate Law Center is going to start the first annual meeting of the 
Corporate Compliance Institute, a three-week intensive training program 
to “retool” lawyers in the area of corporate compliance.  We hope to 
launch an LL.M. program in the area of Corporate Compliance soon 
after that.  We see that as a growth area for us and for Fordham Law 
School. 
Before I turn the podium over to Ben, I just want to thank and 
acknowledge a number of people here tonight.  First of all, John Peloso, 
who is Of Counsel at the Morgan Lewis firm and was the driving force 
behind the creation of both the Corporate Law Center and the Sommer 
Lecture.  We are very grateful to John for the many contributions that he 
has made to the Law School and the partnership that he had helped us 
forge with the Morgan Lewis firm and now with Ben Indek.  We also 
want to thank the SEC Historical Society for being a part of this event 
and the Executive Director of that Society, Carla Rosati, who is here 
tonight.  The Society shares, preserves, and advances the knowledge and 
the history of financial regulation through its virtual museum and an 
archive available online at www.sechistorical.org.  The Society recently 
celebrated its tenth anniversary.  Also, I want to acknowledge the 
members of the Sommer family who are here with us tonight:  Mrs. 
Starr Sommer, her daughter Susan Futter, and her son-in-law Jeff Futter.  
They traveled here to join us for the Sommer lecture as they often do, 
and their presence underscores the special relationship that Fordham had 
and has with Al Sommer, and the memory of Al Sommer.  We are 
grateful also obviously to the members of the New York State 
Department of Financial Services who are here with us tonight 
accompanying Superintendent Lawsky.  This event was going to take 
place on November 1st, and intervening events, a little annoying visit 
from someone named Sandy, got in the way of that event.  We are very 
pleased that you were able to make time and reschedule the program for 
us tonight.  I also want to thank my colleagues in the audience for 
attending tonight. 
Now, it is my pleasure to turn the microphone over to Ben Indek 
from Morgan Lewis. 
 
BEN A. INDEK: Good evening everybody.  On behalf of Morgan 
Lewis, I would also like to welcome you to the 13th Annual A.A. 
Sommer Jr. Lecture. 
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More than 30 years ago, Al Sommer started the Morgan Lewis 
Securities Practice and as a way to honor his role, we created this lecture 
series.  As Sean was mentioning, Al was a Morgan Lewis partner from 
1979 until 1994.  He then became Counsel to the firm.  Al was an 
outstanding public servant.  He was an SEC Commissioner from 1973 to 
1976.  He also served as Chairman of the Public Oversight Board and as 
a public member of the AICPA.  In private practice, he was a trusted 
boardroom lawyer, a prolific author, and an expert commentator on a 
wide range of securities law topics.  With the assistance of many other 
lawyers, several of whom regularly participate in this event, Al 
strengthened and expanded our securities law practice. 
Today we have more than 100 lawyers in about a dozen cities 
around the world devoted to providing advice regarding the securities 
law to financial institutions and public companies.  The Morgan Lewis 
Securities Group now mirrors the structure of the SEC.  We practice in 
the securities enforcement and litigation areas, trading and markets, 
investment management and corporate finance.  Al participated in the 
first two lectures we held at Fordham Law School.  Some of you may 
remember him quizzing the lecturer on particular parts of their remarks.  
Sadly, Al passed away in 2002.  Nevertheless, we are delighted that his 
family, as Sean mentioned, continues their close relationship with 
Morgan Lewis and Fordham.  We are also thankful to the SEC 
Historical Society as Sean mentioned. 
Like Al, our speaker tonight, Superintendent Benjamin M. Lawsky 
is also committed to public service.  And I am confident that Al would 
have heartily complimented Mr. Lawsky for his dedication to 
government service.  Prior to helping to create and lead the New York 
State Department of Financial Services, Mr. Lawsky served as Chief 
Counsel to Senator Charles Schumer on the Senate Judiciary 
Committee, as an Assistant United States Attorney in the Southern 
District of New York, as Deputy Counselor and Special Assistant to 
then-Attorney General Andrew Cuomo and as Governor Cuomo’s Chief 
of Staff.  Finally, in addition to leading the Department of Financial 
Services, his day job, in the aftermath of Hurricane Sandy, Mr. Lawsky 
was tapped by Governor Cuomo as co-chair of the Moreland 
Commission, which has been charged with investigating the preparation 
of and response by New York’s power companies to Sandy and 
Hurricane Irene.  And we appreciate Mr. Lawsky coming tonight after 
our original date in November was postponed due to Sandy. 
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Although separated by a generation, it was also clear to me that Mr. 
Lawsky and Al had a common view on the role of government 
regulation.  After being nominated by Governor Cuomo to serve as the 
Superintendent of Financial Services in 2011, Mr. Lawsky articulated 
several objectives for the new department.  Remarkably, certain of Mr. 
Lawsky’s goals were consistent with those articulated by Al as an SEC 
Commissioner in the mid 1970s.  For example, Mr. Lawsky has stated 
that one of the more important goals of the Department of Financial 
Services is to make sure that it is “right-sized and wisely structured” and 
that it needed to focus on “eliminating redundancies and waste.”  In a 
speech he delivered while on the Commission called “The Delicate 
Balance of Regulation and Competition,” Al commented, and I am 
quoting here, that “it is imperative that every effort be made by the SEC 
to eliminate duplication” in its rules and regulations.1 
As another example, in creating the Department of Financial 
Services, Mr. Lawsky was mindful that a regulator must be “nimble” 
and one that didn’t “stifle innovation.”2  By doing so, the Department 
could contribute in a positive way to New York’s economic future.  In 
the same speech just quoted from Al 40 years ago, Al suggested that 
where it could responsibly do so, the SEC should foster competition, 
rather than regulation. 
Finally, as regulators, Mr. Lawky and Al understood that it is 
critical to forcefully enforce the law against wrongdoers.  Mr. Lawsky 
said, “. . . we must remain vigilant against fraud in our markets and 
against consumers.”3  Al himself could have written those words.  In 
fact, he put it a bit more colorfully in a 1974 speech when he said          
“. . . our enforcement efforts must be strengthened and promoted 
vigorously.  There is other than education, nothing that can serve the 
public better than ferreting out the frauds and putting them out of 
business, throwing sand in their schemes, making the risk too heavy, as 
compared to the potential gains.”4 
                                                                                                                                         
 1. See A.A. Sommer, Jr., Commissioner, SEC, Address at North American 
Securities Administrators Association 58th Annual Conference (Sept. 8, 1975). 
 2. Benjamin M. Lawsky, Testimony Before the New York Senate Committees on 
Insurance and Banking (May 18, 2011), available at http://www.dfs.ny.gov/about/ 
speeches_testimony/t110518.htm. 
 3. Id. 
 4. A.A. Sommer, Jr., Commissioner, SEC, Address to North American Securities 
Administrators (Sept. 24, 1974). 
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Those who paid attention last summer to the Department of 
Financial Services’ pursuit of charges against an international bank 
regarding processing transactions on behalf of Iranian customers would 
have little doubt that Mr. Lawsky would have agreed with Al’s view.  In 
turn, I know that Al would have been keenly interested to hear Mr. 
Lawsky’s lecture this evening.  At Morgan Lewis, we are proud of Al 
Sommers’ affiliation with the firm and delighted to sponsor this annual 
lecture in his honor. 
I am pleased to turn the podium over to our speaker tonight, 
Superintendent of the New York State Department of Financial 
Services, Benjamin Lawsky. 
LECTURE: REGULATING IN AN EVOLVING FINANCIAL LANDSCAPE 
BENJAMIN M. LAWSKY:  The theme of what I want to talk with 
you about today, “Regulating in an Evolving Financial Landscape,” 
speaks to a unique set of challenges that we now face together as 
financial regulators and as a country. 
In the wake of a devastating financial crisis, lawmakers, regulators, 
the financial industry, consumer advocates, and a wide range of other 
stakeholders are building the new architecture of a reformed Wall Street. 
That’s a dynamic, ongoing process. 
As you well know, it didn’t end the day—three years ago, on July 
21, 2010—when the President signed Dodd-Frank into law. 
Through Dodd-Frank, the President and Congress provided 
regulators in Washington with a robust framework for reform.  But they 
left the specific contours of those new rules of the road up to a set of 
federal agencies writing regulations on matters as diverse as the Volcker 
Rule, living wills, orderly liquidation authority, risk retention, qualified 
residential mortgages—and a whole long list of other terms and 
acronyms that were foreign to us only a few short years ago. 
While regulators in Washington have made important progress 
implementing those critical reforms—the rules of the road are still not 
yet fully written. 
And, of course, even when the ink is dry on every last regulation, 
there will remain—as there always is—a constant push and pull between 
regulators and the financial industry as market participants adjust to the 
new rules of the road. 
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Regulators need to remain vigilant.  Because there is a constant 
danger that putting a thumb in the dyke in one part of the financial 
system will cause a leak to spring somewhere else. 
A danger that well-intentioned reforms could push risk to ever-
darker corners of the financial system.  To financial products not yet 
envisioned by even the most far-sighted of regulators. 
The lure of potential profits is too great.  And the dynamism of the 
global economy is too strong for the financial system to stand frozen in 
time. 
This is not to say—as some suggest—that the art of financial 
regulation is a futile endeavor.  That we should resign ourselves to a 
financial system that forever careens from crisis to crisis. 
Far from it. 
It just means that we should approach the constantly evolving 
landscape of the financial sector with a deep sense of humility about the 
capacity of any one set of reforms or safeguards to permanently preserve 
the stability of our kinetic, frenetic global financial system. 
And this deep sense of humility shouldn’t fade with the passage of 
time—when the 2008-09 financial crisis becomes a page in the history 
books rather than a fresh wound. 
To be sure, Dodd-Frank represents the most far-reaching set of 
reforms to our financial system since the Great Depression. 
But we can’t become complacent. 
And one critical part of avoiding that fate—avoiding 
complacency—is what I will call “healthy competition in financial 
regulation.” 
A dose of healthy competition among regulators is helpful and 
necessary to safeguarding the stability of our nation’s financial system.  
Not just today – but for the long term. 
HEALTHY COMPETITION IN FINANCIAL REGULATION 
So what do I mean by healthy competition in financial regulation? 
It’s not so dissimilar to what economists talk about when they 
discuss healthy competition in the broader economy. 
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Or what Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis meant when he 
called the states “laboratories” of democracy during the Progressive 
Era.5 
The New York State Department of Financial Services—or DFS as 
we like to call it—was recently created through the merger of two 
existing state agencies with long histories: the New York State Banking 
Department (which was founded in 1851) and the New York State 
Insurance Department (which was established in 1859). 
However, DFS—in its current, unified structure—is only about 18 
months old.  So, in many ways, we’re the new regulator on the block. 
The Federal Reserve has been around for about a century.  The 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) has been protecting 
depositors since the Great Depression.  And the U.S. Treasury 
Department has served a vital role in managing our nation’s finances 
since the founding of our republic. 
At DFS, we’re fortunate to work with federal partners who have a 
deep well of institutional knowledge and expertise—which complements 
our own. 
We’ve collaborated with our federal partners closely and 
cooperatively on a number of issues of common interest. 
Moreover, at DFS, like our other regulatory partners, we have a 
commitment to thorough, thoughtful, diligent work. 
But we also have another key attribute at DFS. 
We’re nimble.  And we’re agile.  And we’re able to take a fresh 
look at issues across the financial industry—both new and old. 
Sometimes financial regulators find that moving in a new direction 
is akin to turning a battleship in a bathtub.  Institutional inertia can 
stymie even the most well-intentioned of watchdogs. 
But as a newly created regulator, DFS isn’t necessarily wedded to 
existing ways of doing business. 
Indeed, similar to the example of the broader economy, when 
there’s a new entrant into the marketplace, it often spurs others to 
reexamine existing processes and practices.  To innovate. 
At DFS, we can shine a spotlight wherever we think it needs 
shining. 
When banks are engaging in practices that threaten our country’s 
financial stability and national security – we can take swift action. 
                                                                                                                                         
 5. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 387 (1932) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting). 
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When consumers are being abused – we can move rapidly to right 
those wrongs. 
Sometimes, that means DFS may be out in the lead on a particular 
issue. 
But I think that’s healthy.  Not only for the financial regulatory 
community, but for the long-term strength of the financial industry and 
our nation’s economy. 
Problems with Unhealthy Competition 
Indeed, it may also be helpful to define healthy competition in 
opposition to the type of unhealthy competition that we saw during the 
lead up to the financial crisis. 
When the system turned on its head and the debate turned to who 
could water down standards the most. 
Who could provide the “lightest touch” regulation at the firms they 
oversaw. 
In many ways, this created a race to the bottom in which both 
regulators and Wall Street firms were willing participants. 
At DFS, we hope our activism at the state level will at least 
sometimes do the reverse and spur a race to the top. 
Now, some people claim that being a strong and independent 
regulator is at odds with the goals of promoting economic growth and 
job creation. 
That you have to be a laid back or passive regulator to be pro-
growth and pro-business. 
We fundamentally disagree. 
When Governor Cuomo—who himself played a vital role as a 
financial watchdog when he was Attorney General—proposed creating 
DFS, he gave us a clear mission. 
He wanted the industries DFS regulates—banking and insurance—
to thrive.  He wanted to keep New York the financial capital of the 
world. 
And he also wanted to protect consumers and investors better than 
ever before by using all the tools in our tool-belt. 
Those two goals can fit together.  They are not mutually exclusive. 
When consumers, entrepreneurs, and investors have confidence in 
the integrity—the safety and the soundness—of their banks and insurers.  
When they know they’re getting a fair deal.  They’ll do more business 
here. 
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That’s better for the long-term health of the financial industry and 
our economy.  And it is certainly better for the long-term health of our 
system to prevent future crises through smart and active regulation. 
And it’s certainly not pro-business to regulate so lightly that we run 
the risk of another meltdown. 
With that in mind, I wanted to discuss a couple recent examples of 
DFS actions that we hope will play an important, constructive role in 
strengthening the long-term health of the financial system: first, a corner 
of the insurance industry called “force-placed insurance,” and second, 
anti-money laundering enforcement. 
Additionally, I wanted to highlight a few other areas in financial 
regulation that DFS is taking a hard look at right now—where healthy 
competition may play a vital role going forward.  Those include: (1) 
conflicts of interest in the consulting industry; and (2) the troubling role 
private equity firms are playing in insurance markets. 
FORCE-PLACED INSURANCE 
Let’s start with force-placed insurance. 
In October 2011, the New York State Department of Financial 
Services launched an investigation into the force-placed insurance 
industry. 
Force-placed insurance is insurance taken out by a bank—on behalf 
of the homeowner—when a homeowner does not maintain the insurance 
required by the terms of a mortgage. 
This occurs most frequently when a homeowner allows their policy 
to lapse—usually due to financial hardship. 
So, these are folks who are already teetering on the edge of 
financial disaster. 
And, as the name implies, the insurance is forced upon them. 
Now, in certain circumstances, this makes sense because the 
mortgage holder has a right to protect their collateral (In this case, the 
house). 
But when we conducted our investigation, we found that there was 
very little competition and very high rates in the force-placed insurance 
industry. 
Sometimes when a homeowner who was already in financial 
trouble got “force-placed” into an insurance policy their rate jumped two 
to ten times higher—despite the fact that force-placed insurance 
provides far less protection for homeowners than voluntary insurance. 
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Our investigation looked at why this was happening. 
Normally, you’d expect that the bank would do what any of us 
would do when they shop something.  That they’d look for the best 
product at the lowest price. 
What we found is that the banks and the insurers had set up what is 
essentially a form of reverse competition. 
Banks were looking for high prices and high premiums.  And they 
were happy to pay them.  Why?  Because a good portion of the 
premiums were being funneled back to the banks in the form of 
commissions. 
All of this, mind you, at the expense of homeowners and investors, 
who ultimately got stuck with the bill. 
In May, we held public hearings where we brought the industry and 
homeowners to testify.  And that hearing—along with our broader 
investigation—really tore the cover off this issue. 
DFS’s investigation has already produced a recent, major 
settlement with the country’s largest force-placed insurer: Assurant. 
Assurant controls seventy percent of the market in New York. 
That settlement includes restitution for homeowners who were 
harmed, a $14 million penalty paid to the State of New York, and 
industry-leading reforms that will save homeowners, taxpayers, and 
investors millions of dollars going forward through lower rates. 
Indeed, through those reforms, we’re banning the type of practices 
that drove premiums sky- high. 
We’re kicking the kick-backs out of this industry. 
Today, we announced an additional settlement with the nation’s 
second-largest force-placed insurer, QBE, that includes a $10 million 
penalty, restitution for homeowners, and New York’s industry-leading 
reforms.  Now, companies representing more than 90 percent of this 
market in New York have signed onto our reforms. 
When DFS began its investigation, force-placed insurance wasn’t 
an area to which many regulators were paying close attention. 
It was essentially a dirty little secret in the insurance industry. 
But that’s started to change—at least in part—because DFS has 
pushed very hard on this issue. Soon after DFS announced its settlement 
with Assurant, the Federal Housing Finance Agency, which regulates 
mortgage giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, followed our actions by 
filing a notice to ban the lucrative fees and commissions paid by insurers 
to banks on force-placed insurance. 
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To spur further action, DFS also recently urged other state 
regulators to use our settlement with Assurant as a national model.  
Every regulator should be asking, “[i]f you can clean up things in New 
York, why can’t you clean it up nationwide?” 
We’ve received a good response from a number of states so far.  
But the proof will be in the pudding. 
If other states follow through, it will help end the kickback culture 
that has pervaded this industry and hurt far too many homeowners and 
investors. 
ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING ENFORCEMENT 
Another area where I think DFS has begun to play an important and 
constructive role is anti- money laundering—which is so vital to our 
country’s national security. 
This was an area where we felt that, at times, the industry and our 
regulatory structures had gotten used to a certain playing field.  A 
certain silently acknowledged level of consequences tied to a certain 
quantum of illegal and immoral behavior. 
And we felt that this was serious, serious conduct justifying more 
potent action.  And we wanted the banking industry to take it a lot more 
seriously given the threat it posed not only to our financial system, but 
to our national security. 
Banks were sometimes effectively serving as financial conduits for 
terrorists, other enemies of our country, and perpetrators of some of the 
most vile human rights abuses anywhere on earth. 
DFS took action against a particular bank last summer. 
We felt like it was the right thing to do. 
And we did it based on the facts and the law. 
Our investigation uncovered that the bank had hidden from U.S. 
and other regulators roughly 60,000 secret transactions involving at least 
$250 billion—reaping the company hundreds of millions of dollars in 
fees. 
This conduct had left the U.S. financial system vulnerable and 
deprived law enforcement investigators of crucial information used to 
track all manner of criminal activity, including terrorism. 
New York ended up securing a $340 million settlement and a set of 
reforms to help put a stop to this behavior. 
Initially, there was what we believed to be a misplaced focus on the 
fact that DFS had acted more quickly, more robustly, and more 
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independently than some people were used to from a state banking 
regulator. 
That focus was misplaced because it distracted everyone from the 
very real issues at stake when it comes to international money 
laundering on a massive scale for nations like Iran. 
Ultimately, though, we certainly stimulated a debate nationally and 
internationally on this issue. 
And, more importantly, I think we started an alteration or, better 
yet, a recalibration of the regulatory playing field going forward in this 
area. 
Now, you’re seeing more robust action taken – at both the state and 
federal level – to root out this type of illegal money-laundering 
That’s good for our national security.  And it’s good for the 
integrity—and the safety and soundness—of the broader financial 
industry. 
And it was driven in part by the sort of healthy competition I 
mentioned earlier. 
CONSULTING 
Now, let me turn to a new set of issues on which DFS is very 
focused right now.  And where we hope, again, to play an essential role 
in the weeks and months ahead. 
The independence and integrity of monitors and independent 
consultants is another area of vital concern to DFS. 
These consultants are installed at banks and other companies 
usually after an institution has committed serious regulatory violations 
or broken the law.  The intent is that monitors assist companies in 
improving controls and ensuring that violations do not reoccur. 
All too often, however, the outcome of a monitorship is 
disappointing, as we recently saw in the context of the national 
mortgage reviews.  This can be blamed on a number of factors, but it is 
worth considering that our current system significantly undermines the 
independence of the monitors—the monitors are hired by the banks, 
they’re embedded physically at the banks, they are paid by the banks, 
and they depend on the banks for future business. 
If the monitors or consultants are simply puppets of the big banks 
that pay their fees—rather than independent voices—then their work-
product can hardly be deemed reliable. 
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There is also insufficient communication between monitors and 
regulators.  Frequently, monitors never hear from regulators once they 
are put in place at a bank.  This is a problem we can and must fix. 
It’s largely about “managing the monitors” and that is up to 
regulators.  There need to be regular meetings between regulators and 
monitors.  Expectations must be set.  Weekly updates on progress should 
be happening. 
A good monitor can truly improve a troubled company when there 
is a problem, but an ineffective monitor can make the situation much 
worse by creating a false sense of security in the regulator and the 
public. 
At DFS, we have already instituted a more robust process in the 
selection of monitors, and we will be pushing more broadly for change 
in the dynamics between regulators, monitors and institutions. 
You will likely be seeing some innovative initiatives from DFS in 
this area in the coming weeks and months.  And we expect that those 
actions will help propel reform at both the state and federal levels. 
One very important question we all need to be asking is when 
monitors or consultants perform poorly or, worse, when they 
intentionally obscure problems at banks: what should the consequences 
be?  Because if we allow intentional conduct aimed at quietly sweeping 
problems at banks under the rug, we are truly undermining our whole 
system of prudential regulation.  At some point, we must take action that 
has real consequences or the problems in our system will continue to be 
perpetuated rather than deterred. 
PRIVATE EQUITY BUYING ANNUITY COMPANIES 
I’d now like to turn to an emerging trend in the insurance industry 
that DFS has become concerned about. 
Private equity firms are becoming active in the acquisition of 
insurance companies.  In the last few years, private equity firms have 
been targeting fixed and indexed annuity writers. 
For those who are unfamiliar with annuity companies—they sell 
insurance products that essentially promise a certain payment every year 
or month (whatever the terms of the policy may be) over a particular 
period of time. 
If you look at the deals completed or announced to date, private 
equity-controlled insurers now account for nearly thirty percent of the 
indexed annuity market (up from seven percent a year ago) and fifteen 
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percent of the total fixed annuity market (up from four percent a year 
ago). 
These are large numbers, and they indicate a very rapid growth in 
market share.  As you may expect, that’s driving DFS to take a close 
look at these transactions and these firms—to ensure that the safety and 
soundness of these companies and consumers both remain protected. 
Now, as you probably know, annuities are very popular products 
that a significant number of Americans rely on to help finance their 
retirements. 
The risk that we’re concerned about at DFS is whether these private 
equity firms are more short- term focused—when this is a business 
that’s all about the long haul. 
That their focus is on maximizing their immediate financial returns, 
rather than ensuring that promised retirement benefits are there at the 
end of the day for policyholders. 
And—because of their potential short-term focus—here is a risk 
that these companies may not be delivering the level of compliance and 
customer service that we’d expect of them given the importance of this 
product to so many seniors on fixed incomes. 
There can be exceptions, but generally private equity firms follow a 
model of aggressive risk- taking and high leverage, typically making 
high-risk investments.  If just a few of these investments work out, then 
the firm can be very successful—and the failed ventures are just viewed 
as a cost of doing business. 
This type of business model isn’t necessarily a natural fit for the 
insurance business, where a failure can put policyholders at significant 
risk. 
Private equity firms typically manage their investments with a 
much shorter time horizon—for example, three to five years—than is 
typically required for prudent insurance company management.  They 
may not be long-term players in the insurance industry and their short-
term focus may result in an incentive to increase investment risk and 
leverage in order to boost short-term returns. 
Now, at DFS, we regulate both banks and insurance companies.  
And the differences between these two industries are quite striking when 
it comes to private equity investments. 
Private equity firms rarely acquire control of banks, not because 
they are prohibited from doing so, but because the regulatory 
requirements associated with such acquisitions are more stringent than a 
private equity firm may like.  These regulatory requirements in the 
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banking industry are designed—in part—to encourage a long-term 
outlook and ensure that the person controlling the company has real skin 
in the game. 
The long-term nature of the life insurance business raises similar 
issues, yet under current regulations it is less burdensome for a private 
equity firm to acquire an insurer than a bank. 
We need to ask ourselves whether we need to modernize our 
regulations to deal with this emerging trend to protect retirees and to 
protect the financial system. 
This is an area that not too many regulators are looking at.  But it’s 
one where DFS is moving to ramp up its activity. 
And we hope that other regulators will soon follow suit. 
SHADOW INSURANCE 
Another area that we’re hard at work on relates to the use of what 
are called captive insurance companies, used to quietly off-load risk and 
increase leverage at some of the world’s largest financial firms. 
In July 2012, the New York State Department of Financial Services 
initiated a serious investigation into this somewhat obscure area that—
we believe—could put insurance policyholders and taxpayers at greater 
risk. 
Insurance companies use these captives to shift blocks of insurance 
policy claims to special entities—often in states outside where the 
companies are based, or else offshore (e.g., the Cayman Islands) —in 
order to take advantage of looser reserve and oversight requirements.  
(Reserves are funds that insurers set aside to pay policyholder claims.) 
In a typical transaction, an insurance company creates a “captive” 
insurance subsidiary, which is essentially a shell company owned by the 
insurer’s parent.  The company then “reinsures” a block of existing 
policy claims through the shell company—and diverts the reserves that 
it had previously set aside to pay policyholders to other purposes, since 
the reserve requirements for the captive shell company are typically 
lower.  (Sometimes the parent company even effectively pays a 
commission to itself from the shell company when the transaction is 
complete.) 
However, this financial alchemy, let’s call it “shadow insurance,” 
does not actually transfer the risk for those insurance policies off the 
parent company’s books because, in many instances, the parent 
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company is ultimately still on the hook for paying claims if the shell 
company’s weaker reserves are exhausted (“a parental guarantee”). 
That means that when the time finally comes for a policyholder to 
collect their promised benefits after years of paying premiums—such as 
when there is a death in their family—there is a smaller reserve buffer 
available at the insurance company to ensure that the policyholders 
receive the benefits to which they are legally entitled. 
We believe that shadow insurance also puts the stability of the 
broader financial system at greater risk.  Indeed, in a number of ways, 
shadow insurance is reminiscent of certain practices used in the run-up 
to the financial crisis, such as issuing subprime mortgage-backed 
securities (“MBS”) through structured investment vehicles (“SIVs”) and 
writing credit default swaps on higher-risk MBS.  Those practices were 
used to water down capital buffers, as well as temporarily boost 
quarterly profits and stock prices at numerous financial institutions.  
And ultimately, those practices left those very same companies on the 
hook for hundreds of billions of dollars in losses from risks hidden in the 
shadows and led to a multi-trillion dollar taxpayer bailout. 
Similarly, shadow insurance could leave insurance companies less 
able to deal with losses.  The events at AIG’s Financial Products unit in 
the lead up to the financial crisis demonstrate that regulators must 
remain vigilant about potential threats lurking in unexpected business 
lines and at more weakly capitalized subsidiaries within a holding 
company system. 
We are hard at work on our continuing investigation into shadow 
insurance.  And we hope to shed light on and further stimulate a national 
debate on this important issue to our financial system. 
CONCLUSION 
Now, I’ve highlighted a number of areas where DFS has taken a 
leadership role and sought to push reform. 
But the role of state regulators can and should vary based on the 
particular context. 
It really comes down to a question of federalism—the relationship 
between the states and the federal government. 
What I will call collaborative or cooperative federalism is usually 
the best kind of federalism.  When we work closely and together and 
symbiotically with our federal partners. 
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A great example of this is what DFS has been doing to partner with 
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) in the areas of debt 
collectors and payday lending. 
In other areas, where there has been less focus on a particular issue 
at the federal level, a form of persuasive federalism sometimes 
emerges—where the state tries to lead by example and stimulate 
national reform.  DFS’s work in the force-placed insurance industry is a 
great example. 
On the far end of the spectrum is what I’ll call, for lack of a better 
term, coercive federalism.  Coercive federalism should be rare.  But 
sometimes it’s necessary.  Sometimes a state must act alone to change 
the rules of the game.  DFS’s work on anti-money-laundering 
enforcement is a good example here. 
Now, I listed three types of federalism.  But if I had to give them an 
overarching label, I would call DFS’s overall approach going forward 
catalytic federalism. 
We will continue to evaluate the appropriate role of the state 
regulator on an issue-by-issue basis, depending on the context. 
As I noted at the beginning of the speech, we inhabit a constantly 
evolving financial ecosystem.  And we will remain nimble and agile as 
we attempt to affect change wherever our ever-changing markets need 
that stimulus. 
Change is good.  And a robust marketplace of ideas among 
financial regulators is a key strength of our system. 
Indeed, our federal regulators are leading on a number of important 
issues. 
Today, the Federal Reserve and Treasury—for example—are 
leading the charge on two areas of vital concern to long-term financial 
stability: money market reform and addressing potential sources of risk 
in the tri-party repo market. 
The SEC—together with its law enforcement partners—has fought 
hard to crack down on insider trading.  And the SEC is also working to 
modernize investor disclosures in an era of Twitter, Facebook, and other 
social media products that didn’t even exist a decade ago. 
The Commodity Futures Trading Commission has taken a 
leadership role in cracking down on past abuses in LIBOR and 
proposing future reforms so that they don’t happen again. 
The CFPB—led by Richard Cordray, who is just one of the bright, 
shining stars of the Obama Administration – has staked out new ground 
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in the fight to arm families with the clear, concise information they need 
to make the financial choices that are best for them. 
In recent years, the FDIC has really been ahead of the curve on the 
issues of providing relief to struggling homeowners and ensuring banks 
have the capital they need to withstand unexpected financial shocks and 
losses. 
The critical point is that through healthy competition—in this 
marketplace of ideas—the best ideas will hopefully rise to the top. 
That the ideas that withstand the informed scrutiny of fellow 
regulators, the media, the public and other stakeholders will one day win 
out.  (Even if it’s not today.)  And that those ideas come out better for 
being battle tested. 
I think our financial system, our economy, and our country will 
ultimately be better for it.  When regulators speak their mind, say their 
peace and engage in a vigorous debate through healthy competition. 
Thank you.  And I look forward to taking your questions. 
